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Introduction 
 
The deployment of CCTV surveillance in the UK provides an invaluable learning opportunity for 
other societies. Even this claim might be a too controversial starting point for some, for as Gras 
(2004) has argued, while the UK may have led Europe in terms of the scale of its CCTV 
investment, other commentators are not so convinced that the UK’s mechanisms of legal and 
political oversight have kept pace or that the UK model is one to be followed anyway (Riches, 
2006). Over two decades the UK government has been a world leader in CCTV investment.  In 
the bold words of the UK Home Office ‘In many ways, we have led the world from its early 
introduction in the 1970s to the massive growth in CCTV installation and use in the 1990s’ (Home 
Office/ACPO, 2007).  During the latter half of the 1990s almost four-fifths of the entire Home 
Office crime prevention budget was spent on CCTV (Armitage, 2002; Goold, 2004: 40).  
Furthermore, between 1999 and 2003 alone, a total of £170 million CCTV funding was made 
available to local authorities following a competitive bidding process. This led to over 680 CCTV 
schemes being installed in town centres and other public spaces (Home Office/ACPO, 2007: 7). 
 
Perhaps understandably, with the rapid rolling out of a relatively untried technology, many 
mistakes were made; lessons were often learned only slowly, and sometimes the hard way, about 
what CCTV could and could not achieve.  Goold went so far as to note that, although the 
Government was prepared to fund the development of new CCTV systems in many British cities, 
‘it apparently has no great interest in seeing whether they actually work’ (2004: 41).  Accordingly 
CCTV grew very fast in the UK context, rather faster than was justified by any evidence of its 
impact or effectiveness for, as we shall see, CCTV appeared to have only a negligible effect on 
crime rates in the areas it had been deployed.  Yet, despite this, a wholly unrealistic expectation 
prevailed, sustained in part by an unholy alliance of enthusiastic police entrepreneurs, security 
industry marketing agents and fearful citizens, that CCTV could solve many of our public area 
crime and disorder problems.  As a Home Office evaluation from 2005 concluded:   
 
‘[CCTV] was oversold – by successive governments – as the answer to crime problems. Few 
seeking a share of the available funding saw it as necessary to demonstrate CCTV’s 
effectiveness… Yet it was rarely obvious why CCTV was the best response to crime in particular 
circumstances’ (Gill and Spriggs, 2005).   
 
As other countries increase their levels of CCTV investment, the UK experience can provide 
useful lessons, significantly improving the process of policy transfer, avoiding mistakes, 
developing better practice, clarifying issues, and even saving money.  Learning from the UK 
experience, adding the evidence, can make a reality of the promise of ‘evidence-led’ policy 
development.  More than this, in an area of policy-making that goes to the heart of questions of 
state power and security and citizen privacy and individual rights, the issues surrounding the 
management, governance and oversight of CCTV systems in the UK can be a useful basis upon 
which other societies can plan their own.  As EFUS moves towards the development of a Europe-
wide code of practice and ethics for CCTV, the British experience can provide a salutary lesson.  
In a wider sense the British experience of CCTV also bears out an uncomfortable truth of the 
politics of law and order: that ‘crime control strategies … are not adopted because they are 
known to solve problems’ (Garland, 2001: 26).  Policies and strategies are often adopted because 
they are politically expedient, popular, cheap, consistent with existing priorities or favoured by 
dominant interests, amongst other reasons. As Savage has noted, much of the law and order 
politics of the 1990s were fundamentally driven by politics and ideology rather than research 
(Savage, 1998: 172). It is as plausible to argue (Squires and Measor, 1996a) that the various 
‘CCTV challenge’ funding competitions organised sequentially by the Home Office from the 1990s 
– and the form that these took, matched funding-bids based upon public/private partnerships - 
were as much about kick-starting these local crime prevention partnerships (‘responsibilisation’ 
strategies) as they were about funding CCTV itself.  It is arguable that the CCTV industry in the 
UK was a spectacular beneficiary of a unique combination of circumstances and its own slick 
publicity. We might proceed rather differently a second time around. 
 
So, at a time when the perceived threats posed by crime, violence, disorder and terrorism are 
generating new demands for security and when the security industries themselves are sensing 
lucrative new markets (Loader, 2008),
1
 it is incumbent upon the research and evaluation 
community to do two things:  
 
[1] to ensure that the measures of crime prevention adopted actually deliver 
the crime reduction benefits promised,  
 
[2]  to ensure that these measures avoid becoming expensive ways of 
intensifying an already tense and often dysfunctional law and order politics, for 
instance by augmenting the powers of the police vis a vis the rights of citizens; 
reinforcing problematic social boundaries between supposed ‘innocent citizens’ 
and ‘others’; demonizing youth and other ‘visible’ public groups (Squires, 2006); 
subsidising the security of the affluent and redistributing (displacing) crime risks 
onto the already vulnerable (Hope, 2001) and facilitating the emergence of more 
risk averse and ultimately less accountable public order. 
 
French author and social commentator Loic Wacquant has catalogued such developments in the 
USA over the past decade and cautions against Europeans following suit, trying to tackle crime 
and disorder problems by criminal justice and security measures alone.  He notes, ‘any policy 
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   ‘I have now lost track of the number of CCTV providers who say that Eastern Europe and 
the rest of the world is where they are headed because there is not much more you can do here 
(UK)’ (Loader, 2008: 223) 
claiming to treat even violent crime solely with the criminal justice apparatus is condemning itself 
to programmed inefficiency… aggravating the malady it is supposed to cure (Wacquant, 2009: 
275-6).   
 
Accordingly, the adoption of CCTV in the UK, while resembling a search for the ‘magic bullet’ 
cure-all, accompanied by a populist, but ill-informed, wave of public support, does not represent a 
path one would recommend that any other countries should necessarily or blindly follow.  This is 
not because the technology has simply not delivered the promised benefits (many of these were 
exaggerated, unrealistic and unreasonable anyway) but rather because the adoption of CCTV 
begs many other questions about law enforcement and the practice of policing, all of which 
require serious consideration if this technology is to be effectively integrated into the criminal 
justice and security infrastructures of different societies.  In different societies, citizens and 
political authorities may answer such questions in quite different ways and they may want CCTV 
cameras to help solve different problems.  This, in a sense, is the very first point.  We should ask 
not what can CCTV cameras do for us but, rather, what problems do we want to tackle and how 
might CCTV surveillance help?   
 
Policing perspectives 
 
By 2007, while acknowledging that there was still a ‘debate’ over ‘how effective CCTV is in 
reducing and preventing crime’ (Home Office/ACPO, 2007: 11) the UK Home Office and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) were sufficiently forthright to acknowledge that while 
CCTV has made a contribution to ‘protecting the public and assisting the police’, this had 
occurred ‘despite CCTV systems being developed in a piecemeal fashion with little strategic 
direction, control or regulation [and] this approach has failed to maximise the potential of our 
CCTV infrastructure.  This ‘lack of a coordinated approach to CCTV development,’ the report 
continued, ‘poses significant risks in terms of compatibility of systems, cost of accessing the 
images and the potential loss of operational effectiveness’ (2007: 1-2) Yet, as we have noted, 
beyond these essentially operational issues of utility, impact  and effectiveness lie many further 
questions pertaining to democracy, rights, citizenship, oversight, accountability and redress, all of 
which have a bearing upon public trust and confidence in policing. Societies developing their own 
CCTV surveillance systems need to consider these matters too, not just the technical questions.   
 
Whereas the police were now willing to acknowledge criticisms that the academic, research and 
evaluation, community had been making for a nearly decade or more (Brown, 1995; Squires and 
Measor, 1996a and 1996b; Norris, Moran and Armstrong, 1998; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; 
Short and Ditton, 1998; Skinns, 1998) the response has not entailed any unpacking of the 
complex CCTV systems currently in place, rather a ‘national strategy’ has been advanced to 
address the failings of the hitherto ‘haphazard and incremental’ CCTV expansion of recent years 
(ACPO/Home Office, 2007).  Of course this would not be the first time that criminal justice policy-
makers have called for ‘more and better’ of something to tackle the perceived failings of an 
earlier, seemingly insufficient, dose of the same solution.  
 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the British Security Industry Association was having none of it, their 
spokesperson noting that, while CCTV growth may have been piecemeal, the real faults lay with 
police forces which had not maximised the potential of their own systems (Jane’s Police Product 
Review, 2007: 1).  It seems that, as in other areas of criminal justice, a troubling circularity of 
thought prevails.  Whatever problems are associated with CCTV, more CCTV is the solution, both 
our police and our security industry seem to agree on this simple fact.  The real issue, however, 
and this is the lesson for other societies, is to try to think outside this particular box – or even 
beyond the camera.   
 
More recently, however, enthusiastic support has been voiced for CCTV from another policing 
source.  In his controversial memoir, The Terrorist Hunters (Hayman, 2009) former Assistant 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Andy Hayman, wrote of the significant contribution that 
he believed surveillance technologies were making to contemporary policing: 
 
‘Despite the concerns of civil liberties groups, the surveillance society of CCTV cameras, listening 
devices and databases recording our e-mail and phone activity, our criminal and car records, and 
anything else we care to think of, is paying off big time when it comes to catching  criminals and 
terrorists’ [246]. 
 
That brief comment, the points it makes explicit and those it doesn’t, connects with so many of 
the issues which run to the heart of many questions about the role of CCTV in effective public 
safety management.  In the first place Hayman presents the contribution of surveillance 
technologies ‘despite the concerns of civil liberties groups’ as if there is always an inherent 
contradiction between policing and freedom.  It is not necessarily so, although this debate takes 
us back to the first establishment of uniformed policing in London.  As Robert Peel (founder of the 
Metropolitan Police in 1829) remarked, ‘Liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by 
organised gangs of thieves, and in leaving the principal streets of London in the nightly 
possession of drunken women and vagabonds (Sir Robert Peel, 1829).  Properly established, 
appropriately managed and effectively monitored, surveillance can enhance safety, security and 
freedom.  
Yet Hayman’s point also refers to surveillance technologies other than CCTV, making the point 
that this whole area of policing and security management has changed rapidly during recent 
years such that the social implications, the law and principles of governance have not always kept 
pace with the technological potential (Surveillance Studies Network, 2007).  Yet when technology 
leads, in such a fashion, a kind of ‘mission drift’ can occur where technologies are used in ways 
that were never intended, resulting in costly and inappropriate investment and supposed solutions 
(‘technological fixes’) that are ineffective, leading to scepticism and disillusion all round when the 
system does not deliver the anticipated results (HO/ACPO, 2007). Some of these problems have 
been certainly been true of CCTV use in the UK, for example they also arose in the investigation 
of the 2005 London suicide bombings ‘in relation to the lack of [system] integration, the quality of 
images and the difficulties associated in retrieving digitally recorded footage,’ as ACPO has 
acknowledged (Home Office/ACPO 2007, 8-9).  Furthermore at least one study has concluded 
that improved street-lighting could have a more significant preventive impact on crimes recorded 
than CCTV (Farrington and Welsh, 2002) – and street-lighting was much cheaper. 
 
In a related fashion, Hayman talks of the use of surveillance technologies for ‘catching criminals 
and terrorists’ and yet the widespread adoption of public area CCTV surveillance systems in the 
UK was based upon the cameras’ crime prevention potential.  CCTV, operating within the 
paradigm of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1995) would, it was assumed, deter offenders 
by making them visible and identifiable and by bringing the principle of ‘guardianship’ from routine 
activity theory (Felson, 1998) to otherwise relatively unguarded areas.  Both approaches 
suggested some connection between surveillance and rational choice, that the fact of being 
observed and caught on film would influence behaviour and deter offenders from offending 
(Clarke and Felson, 1993). In practice, however, CCTV proved to have relatively little impact on 
some types of offences, for example inter-personal violence (perhaps due to the influence of 
alcohol). In fact, of virtually all of the evaluation schemes established to monitor the effectiveness 
of surveillance cameras on town centre crime, few looked any further than to assess the impact of 
CCTV on recorded crime trends.  Very few studies followed through to explore CCTV in relation 
to incident management, evidence development, case preparation and prosecution, even as 
police officers themselves were realising that it was here that some of the major benefits of CCTV 
might be found.   
 
A final issue relating to Hayman’s observation concerns what we might call the ‘police point of 
view’.  CCTV’s most enthusiastic supporters are often the police themselves and, when 
presented with a new crime control technology they may be keen to try it out.  However the police 
are not necessarily the best equipped to undertake the problem analysis and, for a long time in 
the UK, CCTV was likened to ‘a cure looking for an illness’.  Commentators may have had a 
strong intuitive sense that CCTV would – indeed should - influence crime levels, but there was 
little available evidence of its effectiveness.  Some commentators have been sceptical arguing 
that police managers might adopt CCTV to allow them to save resources by reducing police 
patrol levels in certain areas (Deane and Sharpe, 2009). At other times the lobbying and 
marketing of CCTV by security industry representatives has been called into question (Loader, 
2008).  Thus, ‘marketing’ by vested interests may have generated unrealistic expectations about 
what security cameras could achieve.  Facing two such sets of potentially vested interests the 
case for an independent evaluation of CCTV schemes might seem incontrovertible.  However, the 
limits of the early CCTV evaluations were often restricted to simple questions of crime reduction 
impact. The potentially much wider role that CCTV technologies might play across a wide range 
of policing activities was rather overlooked: a case of restricted vision, perhaps.  When future 
CCTV systems are considered or when systems are to be modernised and developed these 
issues need appropriate consideration – systems may need to be fit for a variety of purposes as 
the Home Office and ACPO have acknowledged (HO/ACPO, 2007: p.13).  There are further 
complaints, here emanating from the ACPO CCTV survey team itself, that ‘the quality of images 
recorded by CCTV systems varies considerably’, whilst anecdotal evidence also suggests that 
‘over 80% of the CCTV footage supplied to the police is far from ideal, especially if it is being 
used for primary identification’ purposes. (HO/ACPO, 2007: p.12). 
 
Finally, the case for civilian oversight, public accountability and independent monitoring is as 
important in relation to CCTV as in other areas of contemporary policing.  Not only is this 
important in terms of the public understanding of the purpose of CCTV but it also helps establish 
its acceptability and, while enhancing public trust and confidence, can improve the effectiveness 
of policing systems (Honess and Charman, 1992; Gill and Spriggs, 2005). This is an area often 
overlooked, even in the recent UK Home Office CCTV strategy document. While the document 
considers the necessity for inter-agency collaboration, the importance of local stake-holders and 
partners and the need for effective governance and oversight of CCTV planning, it is rather silent 
about the systems of local accountability to which such surveillance systems might be subject.  
Reference is made to national processes of inspection and oversight such as the UK Information 
Commissioner and the Surveillance Commissioner but local arrangements are overlooked, even 
though there are many good examples or templates to draw upon (ICO, 2009).  Conversely, this 
may be an area in which different political cultures or contrasting policing traditions suggest 
alternative solutions.  After all, the point here is not to impose ‘one size fits all’ solutions across 
diverse European cultures, but rather to raise issues that experience has shown are important 
when CCTV surveillance is considered.  As Gras has argued (2004), a number of other cultures, 
amongst them Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden might lay claim to rather more 
stringent regulatory regimes than the UK, and Riches (2006) adding that CCTV developed in a 
largely pragmatic fashion in the UK with little thought given to the monitoring and accountability 
issues until systems were already up and running. 
Drawing conclusions 
 
Problem analysis and Implementation 
 
Taking these issues together we can draw some important lessons from the best available UK 
experiences of CCTV installation and use.  First of all it is worth noting the somewhat surprising 
conclusion draw by Gill and Spriggs in their 2005 evaluation for the UK Home Office: 
 
‘It would be easy to conclude from the information presented …  that CCTV is not effective: the 
majority of the schemes evaluated did not reduce crime and even where there was a reduction 
this was mostly not due to CCTV; nor did CCTV schemes make people feel safer, much less 
change their behaviour (Gill and Spriggs, 2005: 115). 
 
With such a conclusion the main surprise might be why CCTV systems ever took off in the UK to 
the extent that they did.  As we have noted already however, there are other dimensions to this 
story.  Some of the wider political issues we have already noted, here we will consider some of 
the more implementation- related questions that security managers and police, in particular, have 
often been slow to acknowledge and with which they are sometimes rather reluctant to engage.  
As Gill and Spriggs noted, however, a simple story of apparent ‘CCTV failure’ is just as 
misleading as the security industry’s over ambitious claims for CCTV’s ‘success’.   
 
To take a more nuanced and evidence-led view we need to bear in mind a number of issues.  
First, as part of an appropriate problem assessment, there are a number of factors to consider.   
 
Crime rates or criminal incidents alone are not necessarily a good indicator of crime and disorder 
problems, or of public fears and concerns in an area or of the quality and experience people have 
of their community safety.  Policing and crime prevention initiatives have to take this complexity 
on board.   
 
The complex and varied, roles and purposes of a CCTV system: intelligence development, 
evidence gathering, incident management, order maintenance all need to be acknowledged.  
Situational crime reduction, via prevention or deterrence, is not the only outcome.  Clarity about a 
variety of purposes is essential.  As Gill et al., (2003) noted in their evaluation of CCTV project 
implementation:  ‘When considering which type of crime prevention mechanism to use, it is 
important to be clear about the problems in the area and specific about the capabilities of a CCTV 
system to address them. If the two do not correspond, CCTV is not the right solution’ (2003: p.4).    
 
Finally, CCTV systems have to be integrated with existing policing and crime management 
initiatives, this might mean that other policing processes might have to change and develop.  It 
was quite unrealistic to imagine that CCTV systems could have a sustained impacts, on their 
own.  In a similar fashion policing priorities had to be determined by reference to the problems 
requiring solution not driven by any a priori assumptions about the need for surveillance cameras.   
And, as Gill et al (2003) noted, by 1999 the Home Office guidance for CCTV development 
partnerships was insisting that any application for CCTV funding had to set out ‘the criteria for 
identifying a relevant crime prevention mechanism,’ which is to say that CCTV proposals had to 
be supported by evidence of  ‘theoretically sound crime reduction principles which suggest 
plausible causal mechanisms by which [the CCTV system] could work against the current crime 
or disorder problem in the current context (Home Office, 1999, section 4.3).   Gill and Spriggs 
went on to note in their final report, however, that even where CCTV projects had discernible 
objectives which ‘had to be stated in tender documents’, these ‘often did not drive the scheme… 
and were rarely embedded in day-to-day practice’ (Gill and Spriggs, 2005: 116).  So even when 
funding applications did contain evidence and problem analysis these were often overlooked as 
soon as the funding was achieved. 
 
Crime reduction and community safety impacts 
 
The Home Office National CCTV Strategy document when claiming that, ‘there is an ongoing 
debate over how effective CCTV is in reducing and preventing crime’ (2007, p.11) sought, 
perhaps understandably, to keep that very debate alive.  In fact the accumulated evidence from 
research and evaluation, a combination of rather mixed, unimpressive and otherwise 
disappointing or unreliable results, provides the more compelling story. 
 
Many local CCTV evaluations were carried out in the UK on the back of the various waves of 
CCTV installation although these were not always very methodologically rigorous and, as has 
been noted, they were often confined to impact assessments.  Many were also rather too short 
term to provide any reliable evidence of sustained influence on crime trends and patterns.  That 
said, a number of larger and/or comparative projects began to emerge later, as did a growing 
picture of evaluation experience. Welsh and Farrington (2002) undertook a meta-survey of 46 
CCTV evaluation projects (worldwide) although only 22 satisfied the analysis criteria in that: 
CCTV was the main intervention studied, crime outcomes ‘before and after’ were measured and 
that there was a relevant ‘control area’ with which to compare the intervention area. 
 
The results were rather mixed, half of the eligible studies ‘found a desirable effect on crime’ 
although five found an ‘undesireable’ impact, and five more found no significant impact.  The 
CCTV schemes in the UK generally showed a greater range of impacts than those in North 
America.  Furthermore, CCTV ‘had no effect on violent crimes but … a significant desirable effect 
on vehicle crimes’ and on crimes in car parks.  Finally ‘in the city centre and public housing 
setting, there was evidence that CCTV led to a negligible reduction in crime of about two per cent 
in experimental areas compared with control areas’ (Welsh and Farrington, 2002: p. vi).  Noting 
that ‘surveillance studies’ was still a relatively new area the authors went on to suggest that there 
needed to be further research on both the optimal conditions for securing CCTV effectiveness 
and the mechanisms by which positive results are obtained. It seemed fairly clear that an 
appropriate package of interventions was necessary for the best results.  Ultimately, they 
concluded, rather optimistically, that ‘CCTV reduces crime to a small degree’.  Finally, they 
proposed that ‘future CCTV schemes should be carefully implemented in different settings and 
should employ high quality evaluation designs with long follow-up periods. In the end, an 
evidence-based approach to crime prevention which uses the highest level of science available 
offers the strongest formula for building a safer society’ (Welsh and Farrington, 2002: p. vii). 
 
As we have already seen, such conclusions about CCTV surveillance impacts have been 
confirmed in many other similar studies especially the large national study by Gill and Spriggs 
(2005).  These authors also concluded that CCTV appeared to have limited crime reduction 
effects in town centre and residential areas but appeared to work best in relatively contained and 
controlled access locations (hospitals, car parks, shopping malls).  CCTV had poor results on 
impulsive (violence and alcohol-related) offending, but better results on more ‘premeditated’ 
crimes.  As in other studies both ‘halo effects’ (crime reduction in adjacent areas) and crime 
displacement were noted (Gill and Spriggs, 2005: p.vii).  The technical attributes of particular 
systems appeared to have either marginally positive or negative influences on the effectiveness 
of particular systems but these were of relatively little overall significance.  Finally, surveys of 
members of the public in all the CCTV scheme areas found very little evidence of significant 
changes in either behaviour or levels of fear or concern about crime. 
 
As the authors of this report concluded, ‘assessed on the evidence presented in this report, 
CCTV cannot be deemed a success. It has cost a lot of money and it has not produced the 
anticipated benefits’ (Gill and Spriggs, 2005: p.119).  However, they continued by noting that 
lessons are being learned and the technology is improving rapidly with new ‘event-led’, proactive, 
‘intelligent’ behaviour recognition and biometric systems presenting new safety management 
opportunities - whilst also bringing new threats and challenges.  Above all, however, their 
‘evidence based’ conclusion represents a warning against an all too tempting search for technical 
solutions.  CCTV is but a tool, and where it was perceived to have failed this was often because 
the expectations placed upon it were too ambitious or because it was being used in unsuitable 
places for the inappropriate problems.  Systems may have been poorly planned or badly 
implemented, or perhaps they were not effectively integrated into other community safety 
strategies and policing systems. As Haggarty has noted, perhaps one beguiling myth we need to 
question is the unproblematic assumption that there are ‘surveillance solutions’ for social 
problems (Haggarty, 2009: 162).  What the Home Office referred to in 2007 as ‘the search … for 
the panacea of CCTV’ (HO/ACPO, 2007: 40) may be a futile one.  Such ‘solutions’ will 
undoubtedly generate still further problems and dilemmas.   
 
Issues here might include the question of who benefits most from the umbrella of protective 
surveillance: in the UK town centres, high value retail areas were the first major beneficiaries (as 
opposed to residential areas, children’s playgrounds or schools).  These were not necessarily the 
most obvious community safety priorities or the most needy areas, but the nature of the funding 
arrangements in the early schemes meant that occupiers of these areas could most readily afford 
the matched funding investment costs.  Another issue of inequality arises: at whom are the 
cameras mostly directed: who is most frequently under surveillance.  As Shearing (2000) and Von 
Hirsch (2000) have, each in their own way, noted there are profound social and ethical questions 
associated with surveillance processes (Crawford, 1998: 98-101). 
 
These ethical questions stretch backwards to the definition of the crime and security problems 
that we are seeking to solve and forwards into the design, monitoring and integration of the 
systems developed.  Finally they involve the processes for oversight, monitoring and evaluation, 
accountability and redress that need to be part of effective community safety strategies.  Without 
these issues being considered at every stage problems are likely, problems that will diminish the 
effectiveness of the system itself.  However technically sophisticated a system is, it will only be as 
effective as those who operate it and it will only enhance community safety if it meets the needs 
and reassures the citizens it is intended to serve. 
 
As Gill and Spriggs (2005) concluded: 
 
Too much must not be expected of CCTV. It is more than just a technical solution; it requires 
human intervention to work to maximum efficiency and the problems it helps deal with are 
complex. [It can] help reduce crime and to boost the public’s feeling of safety; and it can generate 
other benefits. For these to be achieved though, there needs to be greater recognition that 
reducing and preventing crime is not easy and that ill-conceived solutions are unlikely to work no 
matter what the investment (2005: 120). 
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